On December 25, 2024, in the afternoon, officials from Fingrid, the company responsible for electricity supply in Finland, realized that the main undersea power transmission cable between Finland and Estonia had sustained damage. This resulted in a significant reduction in the electricity supply to Estonia. That evening, Fingrid's senior official, Arto Pahkin, addressed Finland's national broadcaster, stating, "We are investigating various possibilities, including sabotage and technical malfunction, but we have not yet reached a definitive conclusion. At the time of the disruption, at least two ships were present in the part of the sea where the cable runs." This incident has once again highlighted concerns about Russia's deep-sea operations and how Putin's secret weapon—underwater sabotage—could be used to disrupt critical infrastructure. the ship "Eagle S" is part of Russia’s covert naval fleet, which is allegedly used for transporting banned Russian oil products. Finnish police suspect that "Eagle S" may have dragged its anchor along the seabed at the exact location of the "EstLink 2" cable, causing damage. At the site of the incident, an anchor was discovered at a depth of 262 feet, precisely where "Eagle S" had passed that day. Moreover, images taken after the incident clearly show that the ship's left anchor was missing. Finnish police have identified nine suspects in the investigation into the damage caused to the cable. Analysts say that while the possibility of an accident or human error is always considered, the recurring nature of such incidents raises concerns about the security of undersea cables in the event of sabotage. The damage to the 170-kilometer (105-mile) long EstLink 2 cable is the latest in a series of underwater cable disruptions in the Baltic region, a trend that has continued since Russia invaded Ukraine. Following the EstLink 2 incident, NATO decided to increase its military presence in the Baltic Sea, while Estonia deployed a naval vessel to patrol and protect its EstLink 1 undersea power cable. The European Union has classified the destruction of this undersea cable as the latest in a series of suspected attacks on critical infrastructure. There are approximately 600 undersea cables spread across the region, responsible for transmitting electricity and vital information across oceans. These cables often connect to the shore at undisclosed locations, and their total length is around 870,000 miles (1.4 million kilometers). Most of these are data cables crucial for nearly all of the world's internet traffic. That evening, Fingrid's senior official, Arto Pahkin, addressed Finland's national broadcaster, stating, "We are investigating various possibilities, including sabotage and technical malfunction, but we have not yet reached a definitive conclusion. At the time of the disruption, at least two ships were present in the part of the sea where the cable runs." A few hours after the incident, Finland’s Coast Guard intercepted one of the two ships, "Eagle S," a vessel owned by Russia, and escorted it into Finnish waters. Initially, Finnish authorities suspected that this Russian ship had deliberately damaged the "EstLink 2" undersea power cable. According to the European Union, the ship "Eagle S" is part of Russia’s covert naval fleet, which is allegedly used for transporting banned Russian oil products. Finnish police suspect that "Eagle S" may have dragged its anchor along the seabed at the exact location of the "EstLink 2" cable, causing damage. At the site of the incident, an anchor was discovered at a depth of 262 feet, precisely where "Eagle S" had passed that day. Moreover, images taken after the incident clearly show that the ship's left anchor was missing. Finnish police have identified nine suspects in the investigation into the damage caused to the cable.
It is quite evident that relations between Russia and most. Western European countries are extremely strained at the moment. This tension has been escalating with each passing day, especially since 2014, when Russia supported the rebellion in eastern Ukraine, annexed Crimea, and integrated it into Russia. In 2022, when 200,000 Russian troops invaded Ukraine, a wave of outrage swept across the Western world. Now, three years into the war, nearly one million people on both sides have been killed or injured. NATO believes that Russia is also engaged in an undeclared war, known as "hybrid warfare." According to NATO, Russia is targeting Western European countries, aiming either to deter them from providing military assistance to Ukraine or to punish them for doing so. Hybrid warfare also referred to as "gray zone" or "sub-threshold" warfare, occurs when a hostile state carries out covert and untraceable attacks, often under highly mysterious circumstances. Such attacks typically do not lead to direct warfare but are enough to damage a rival nation's critical infrastructure. Dr. Sidharth Kaushal, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, explains, "Deep-diving submarines can sever cables at depths where repairs are extremely difficult. They can also tap into sensitive undersea cables." He further elaborates, "If a conflict with NATO arises, Russia's strategy may involve targeting underwater infrastructure and striking land-based facilities to gradually erode public support for Ukraine in Western countries."
Other examples of hybrid warfare attacks include last year’s incidents of fires breaking out in courier company parcels in the UK, Germany, and Poland. Polish investigators claim that these incidents were rehearsals for targeting flights bound for the US and Canada. Russia's denial of these acts of sabotage has not convinced many Western officials. However, it is suspected that Russia was also behind other attacks on depots and train lines in EU member states, including Sweden and the Czech Republic. These incidents are forcing Western governments to consider the possibility that Russian military intelligence is engaged in a systematic campaign of covert and anonymous attacks against countries supporting Ukraine, aiming to weaken them.
Russia's submarine capabilities are a growing concern for Western nations. This threat is being taken just as seriously as NATO and the European Union demonstrated in 2017 when they established the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki. According to Camino Kavanagh, a researcher in the War Studies department at King’s College London, some states may be drawn to such tactics because they are more easily deniable. Kavanagh stated, "Gray zone activity is very difficult to respond to. However, in light of recent events, states are now performing better in countering these threats." When it comes to Russia’s submarine capabilities, Dr. Siddharth Kaushal explains that the Russian military has a vast infrastructure. According to Dr. Kaushal, Russia’s special forces, Spetsnaz, military intelligence (GRU), and the Russian Navy operate in shallower waters. However, in the deep sea, intelligence gathering and sabotage missions fall under the responsibility of the Directorate for Deep-Sea Research (GUGI), which directly reports to the Russian Ministry of Defense and President Vladimir Putin. Dr. Kaushal explains that GUGI uses surface ships for surveillance, mapping offshore wind farms, and identifying the locations of undersea cables. For deep-sea missions, Russia utilizes "motherships," including repurposed nuclear and cruise missile submarines like the Belgorod. Russia also possesses titanium-built submarines capable of operating at extreme depths, with specialized equipment designed for deep-sea operations. These submarines are operated by a crew of only three highly experienced naval officers who undergo rigorous training similar to that of astronauts. At such depths, detecting these submarines is nearly impossible—even for the U.S. Navy. Russian researcher and author Keir Giles warns, "In light of these factors, potential cable sabotage should not be viewed as an isolated or routine incident. Instead, it must be understood as part of Russia’s broader and systematic program aimed at threatening communication infrastructure and critical systems." Russia’s priority in this program is to ensure dominance over undersea cables and telecommunications, restricting access to information in specific regions and allowing only Russian-controlled communication to flow. According to Keir Giles, "This is seen as a crucial objective because it played a key role in Russia’s annexation of Crimea."
Suspicious movements in underwater infrastructure. Finland is not the only country that has expressed Western concerns over Russian activities, particularly suspicious movements around undersea cables. According to UK Defense Secretary John Healey, in November 2024, a Russian surveillance vessel, Yantar, was spotted loitering suspiciously near the UK’s critical undersea infrastructure. In January 2025, the British Navy once again detected similar suspicious activities when they monitored Yantar’s movements. The UK Ministry of Defence stated that the Russian vessel was engaged in intelligence gathering and mapping the UK's undersea infrastructure. John Healey described these incidents as an example of Russian aggression. The UK has approximately 60 undersea cables spread across various coastal locations. The East Anglia and southwestern coastal regions are particularly significant due to the high concentration of these cables. Western concerns have been mounting over the potential risks posed by such Russian activities, as any disruption to these cables could have severe economic and security consequences. Keir Giles argues that any attack on the UK’s submarine infrastructure would not only disrupt communication but also create additional systemic problems across the country. The Russian embassy in London dismissed the UK’s allegations against Yantar as entirely baseless. They accused the UK of deliberately using the issue to escalate tensions.
Potential Threats to Undersea Cables. This year, the UK's National Security Committee has launched an investigation into potential attacks on undersea cables and the threats facing the country. Russian author and analyst Edward Lucas has expressed concerns, stating, "Russia may have already deployed its underwater drones on the seabed, waiting for orders to attack cables and pipelines—orders that may or may not come at any time." He further remarked, "Russia’s surveillance vessel Yantar has been operating in deep waters for years, and we have no idea what it has been doing." Lucas highlighted that the global network of submarine cables and pipelines was built largely on blind trust. "We never imagined that we would become a target of a hostile state. But now, we are witnessing the consequences of decades of misplaced trust. Our only hope is to convince the Russians that any attack on our undersea infrastructure would come at a very high cost." Dr. Camino Kavanagh explains that recent submarine cable designs now take potential failures into account, making it essential to have contingency plans in place. Keir Giles criticizes Western nations for their delayed response in acknowledging this challenge. However, he notes that cutting a single cable today would not have the same devastating impact it might have had when Russia first considered this strategy. Dr. Kavanagh attributes this to the presence of multiple interconnected cables and a more robust undersea repair system. "It is reassuring that many countries are now focusing on better understanding their vulnerabilities and maintaining close collaboration with the relevant industry," she added. Russia's Denial. Despite growing concerns and investigations into these threats, Russia has denied any involvement in such sabotage efforts. However, intelligence reports suggest that Russia may have been behind other attacks on depots and train lines in EU member states, including Sweden and the Czech Republic. These incidents have prompted Western governments to consider the possibility that Russian military intelligence is engaged in a systematic campaign of covert and anonymous attacks against countries supporting Ukraine, aiming to weaken them.
The Growing Threat to Undersea Infrastructure. All these incidents, which Russia has denied any involvement in, have come as a wake-up call for European governments. It has become clear that vital undersea communication routes are not entirely secure, and protecting them at all times is practically impossible. Keir Giles states, “This threat has always existed. In the current environment, those who pose the threat feel more confident in testing these systems and assessing their impact.” For Russia, this hybrid warfare also presents an opportunity to learn. “They are observing the effects while also assessing how effective and timely the targeted country’s investigations, legal actions, and responses are.” In the long run, Russia’s deep-sea operations could signal a looming threat—one that, in near-unimaginable wartime scenarios, could severely impact European economies and the daily lives of its citizens. Keir Giles further warns, “And this threat is not just limited to undersea cables. It extends to all other means by which Russia can influence people’s lives from a great distance.” He elaborates, saying, “These include proxy-led sabotage attacks, cyberattacks that take control of your computers and leave you paying the price, placing incendiary devices on passenger aircraft, and, ultimately, the possibility of long-range missile strikes without warning and a declared war—because that is how Russia operates.” The challenge of countering the threat of sabotage against undersea cables is just one of the many battles the West faces in dealing with Vladimir Putin’s Russia.
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