In Afghanistan, a suicide bomber from the global extremist group known as the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) recently carried out an explosion near a bank in Kunduz. ISIS later claimed responsibility for the attack, stating that it targeted Taliban soldiers who had gathered to collect their monthly salaries. However, several civilians were also killed in the blast. This marks the second time in two months that ISIS-K (Khorasan Province) has deployed a suicide bomber. Two months ago, a suicide attacker killed Taliban Minister for Refugees—Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani, inside his office. For the Afghan Taliban, history seems to be repeating itself. A weapon they once wielded—suicide bombers—is now being used against them. ISIS has repeatedly used this strategy to target Taliban personnel. None of the five key Taliban government officials who were targeted in ISIS suicide attacks have survived. In this context, an analysis has been conducted on the history of suicide bombers—how this weapon and strategy evolved, and specifically how it has been used in Afghanistan. But before that, let’s examine the suicide bombing operations that ISIS has carried out against the ruling Taliban government.
A year after the Taliban returned to power, Rahimullah Haqqani—one of the most influential Taliban clerics—had no idea that the disabled man approaching him was a suicide bomber. As soon as the man reached Rahimullah Haqqani, he detonated explosives hidden inside his plastic prosthetic leg. Less than a month later, another prominent pro-Taliban cleric, Mujib ur Rahman Ansari, was killed in a suicide bomber attack. At the time, Taliban government spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid urged clerics to be cautious, acknowledging that preventing such attacks was a difficult task. Six months after that deadly attack, Dawood Muzammil—the governor of Balkh and a trusted associate of Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada—was killed when a suicide bomber detonated his explosive belt inside his office. Four months after the Balkh governor’s assassination, a suicide bomber in an explosives-laden car targeted the vehicle of Badakhshan’s deputy and acting governor, Nisar Ahmad Ahmadi. This marked the killing of yet another Taliban leader by a suicide bomber. Rahimullah Haqqani, known for his anti-ISIS-K stance, had survived at least two previous assassination attempts. In the case of Balkh governor Dawood Muzammil—who had previously led a large-scale campaign against ISIS-K in Nangarhar—the suicide bomber managed to bypass security barriers. Similarly, in the assassination of Khalil ur Rahman Haqqani, the suicide bomber successfully passed through a security scanning gate. By now, it is clear that ISIS-K remains a serious challenge for the Taliban government. Despite the Taliban repeatedly claiming to have crushed ISIS-K, they appear unable to prevent suicide bomber attacks.
During the nearly decade-long war between the Mujahideen and Soviet forces in Afghanistan, not a single suicide attack took place. Referring to the Soviet era, Steve Coll wrote in his book Ghost Wars that "Mohammad Yousaf, the head of the Afghan section of Pakistan’s military intelligence service, attempted to blow up the strategic Salang Tunnel, located north of Kabul." "He planned to use trucks filled with explosives for the mission. Pakistan’s military intelligence agency helped load tankers with explosives, but the problem was that Soviet troops immediately stopped any truck inside the tunnel." "As a result, executing such a mission did not seem practical unless the truck driver was willing to sacrifice his life. The Afghan fighters trained by Yousaf rejected the idea of suicide bombing, considering it against their religious beliefs." According to Steve Coll, "Only Arab volunteers—hailing from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Algeria, and other countries—supported the idea of suicide attacks. They grew up in a completely different culture, spoke their own language, had their own interpretation of Islam, and were far from their homes and families." However, the Afghan Mujahideen did not adopt suicide bombing as a strategy. It is worth noting that Pakistan’s first-ever suicide attack occurred on November 19, 1995, at the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad. A suspected Egyptian attacker detonated a truck loaded with explosives inside the embassy compound, killing 14 people.
Less than two decades later, the hatred for suicide attacks transformed into enthusiasm. In 2006, during the Taliban's war against U.S. and allied forces, they carried out 119 suicide attacks in just one year—almost one every three days—excluding failed attempts. Sirajuddin Haqqani, whose uncle Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani was killed in a suicide bombing six months after the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan, once stated that over the past 15 years, 1,050 members of his group, the Haqqani Network, had carried out suicide attacks. Two months after the Taliban came to power, Sirajuddin Haqqani met with the families of Taliban members who had carried out suicide bombings at Kabul's Intercontinental Hotel—a hotel that itself had been targeted twice by Taliban suicide attackers. A few months ago, under Sirajuddin Haqqani’s orders, a memorial was built in Paktia province to honor a suicide bomber believed to be one of the first Taliban militants to use a car bomb against a convoy of U.S. vehicles. Meanwhile, suicide bombings also escalated in Pakistan. Seven years after Pakistan's first suicide attack, the second one occurred on May 8, 2002, outside the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi, targeting French engineers. This attack killed 14 people, including 11 French nationals. It was particularly significant as it was the first time a Pakistani suicide bomber was involved in such an attack in the country.
According to renowned British journalist Carlotta Gall, nearly every village in the Pishin district of Pakistan’s Balochistan province had families who had lost their sons to the war in Afghanistan. In Pakistan, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has also used suicide bombers, and more recently, the separatist Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) has deployed them as well. Famous American journalist Steve Coll, in his book Directorate S, wrote that during military operations in Waziristan, a Pakistani army officer discovered a Taliban-run school dedicated to training suicide bombers. This training camp was located in Razmak, a district in North Waziristan near the Afghan border. Suicide bombers were trained inside concrete rooms. According to Steve Coll, the walls of these rooms were decorated with images depicting the afterlife—rivers of milk and honey, fruit-laden trees, lush green mountains, illuminated streets, and animals like camels and horses. One room featured images of veiled young women, including one filling a clay pot from a pond. However, the faces of the women and animals were left blank. In the final room, the Pakistani officer saw the names of suicide bombers who had completed their missions written in blood. Steve Coll further stated that the Pakistani Taliban administered injections of sedatives like Valium and Xanax, as well as weekly painkiller injections, to suicide bombers before their attacks. The training facility primarily selected young boys who were either ill, suffering from severe mental and psychological disorders, or driven by a desire for revenge. Those who were mentally ill or disabled were often used in remote-controlled suicide bombings.
Suicide bombings in Pakistan and Afghanistan had severe consequences. In Afghanistan, foreign forces began marking their vehicles with warnings that read "Do not approach." Under the command of General McChrystal, reviews conducted by international forces in 2009 revealed that, within just. Three months, British troops opened fire on civilian vehicles 93 times due to perceived threats. As a result, 200 civilians were killed or injured, yet none of them turned out to be suicide bombers. To protect themselves from potential Taliban attacks, Turkish forces, who were deployed in Afghanistan as part of NATO, placed Quranic verses on their vehicles.
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